

Economic Servitude

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2000 Years of Economic Servitude: From Chains to Credit Scores

A Unified Thesis on Extraction, Enclosure, and the Evidence for Universal Basic Income

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Author's Note

This paper exists because two children died.

Not in a war. Not in a famine. In the richest period of human civilisation, in countries with trillion-dollar economies, surrounded by more food, more medicine, more knowledge than any generation before them. They died because the systems that were supposed to protect them were too busy protecting themselves.

Their names were Lily and Joshua. And if that makes you uncomfortable — good. Sit in it. Because the discomfort you feel reading two names is a fraction of the discomfort their mother carries every day. And everything in this paper — every data point, every historical arc, every dismantled objection — exists because grief turned into design. Because someone who lost everything looked at the machine that took it and said: *I'm going to understand how this works. And then I'm going to replace it.*

This paper is No. 4 in a series of 19. The series is not an academic exercise. It is a blueprint. Each paper proves a piece of what the 14 OMXUS Goals require:

Goal 2 — Work 22 hours max. Keep your pay. Choose your hours. Work from home. This is the goal that lives at the centre of this paper. The evidence shows that automation already did the work. The productivity gains went to capital, not labour. The hours you work beyond what's necessary exist to service debt — mortgage debt, consumer debt, education debt — that exists because the economy is designed to extract from you, not to serve you. Two thousand years of extraction mechanisms, each wearing the costume of its era. This paper strips the costumes off.

Goal 1 — Direct democracy. You cannot participate in self-governance when you work 50 hours a week. The 22-hour week is not a luxury — it is a prerequisite for citizenship. Switzerland manages

four referendums a year because Swiss citizens have time to read, think, and vote. The connection between economic servitude and political servitude is not metaphorical. It is mechanical.

Goal 3 — Free all prisoners. The Cherokee Casino Dividend data in Section 4.6 shows a 40% decline in child psychiatric disorders and a 22% reduction in criminal offences when families receive unconditional income. Crime does not come from criminals. It comes from conditions. Change the conditions, the crime disappears — without a single arrest, without a single cage, without a single dollar spent on punishment.

Goal 6 — Re-employ all fired staff. When UBI removes the coercion from employment, work becomes a choice. Stockton’s SEED data shows that full-time employment *increased* from 28% to 40% under guaranteed income. People do not stop working when you stop threatening them with starvation. They start working on things that matter.

Goal 9 — No foreign investment in housing. Australian housing at 14x median income is the modern equivalent of tied tenancy. You cannot leave the lord’s land because you owe the lord rent. You cannot leave the mortgage because you owe the bank interest. The mechanism is identical. Only the paperwork changed.

Goal 14 — Cancer is 90% preventable. Namibia’s basic income grant cut child malnutrition from 42% to 10%. What people eat is shaped by what they can afford. Poverty forces reliance on the cheapest, most processed, most harmful food supply. Economic servitude is not just an economic problem. It is a health problem, and the health consequences are deliberate in the sense that they are predictable, known, and maintained.

The question this paper answers is not “should we have UBI?” The evidence answered that decades ago. The question is: *why don’t we?* And the answer is two thousand years old.

— A.A. & L.N.C.

Abstract

This paper traces the mechanisms of economic extraction across two millennia — from Roman tribute through feudal serfdom, industrial wage labour, and modern debt-based finance — to demonstrate that the *form* of economic control changes while the *function* persists: extracting labour and resources from the many to concentrate wealth among the few. Each era legitimises its extraction through the prevailing ideology of the time: “natural order” becomes “divine right” becomes “free markets” becomes “economic necessity.” The paper then synthesises evidence from the most significant global implementations and pilot programs of Universal Basic Income to evaluate whether unconditional cash transfers can break this cycle. Through comparative case study methodology, we examine permanent programs (Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend, Macau Wealth Partaking Scheme), large-scale randomised controlled trials (Finland, Stockton SEED, GiveDirectly Kenya), politically terminated pilots (Ontario), natural experiments (Cherokee Casino Dividend), and partial implementations (Iran, Namibia, Marica, India, Australia’s JobSeeker supplements). Across all cases, consistent findings emerge: UBI programs produce no significant reduction in labour force participation, generate measurable improvements in physical and mental health, reduce poverty and inequality, and stimulate local economic activity through multiplier effects. Less than one percent of disbursements in tracked programs were spent on alcohol or tobacco. Full-time employment among Stockton recipients increased from 28% to 40%; child malnutrition in Namibia fell from

42% to 10%; psychiatric disorders among Cherokee children declined by 40%. We systematically address the twenty most common objections to UBI with reference to empirical evidence. The paper further examines funding mechanisms, Australian-specific implementation pathways, and the political architecture required to make unconditional economic security permanent and irreversible. We conclude that economic servitude is historically contingent — not a natural law — and that the evidence base for its replacement is now beyond reasonable dispute.

Keywords: economic servitude, universal basic income, cash transfers, extraction mechanisms, poverty reduction, Australian housing affordability, debt-based finance, labour history, randomised controlled trials, social policy, sovereign wealth funds, economic security

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1. Introduction: The Machine That Eats People

There is no villain in this story.

That needs saying first, because everything that follows looks like an indictment, and in a sense it is — but not of people. Of arrangements. Of systems that were designed by people who thought they were doing what was best, or who never thought about it at all, or who inherited a structure and assumed it was natural because it was old.

This paper traces a single function across two thousand years of human economic organisation: **extraction**. The taking of labour, resources, time, health, and autonomy from the many to concentrate wealth and power among the few. The function has never changed. What changes — with remarkable creativity and historical regularity — is the *form*.

In Rome, they called it slavery. In medieval Europe, they called it serfdom. In the factories of Manchester and the mills of Lowell, they called it wages. Today, they call it mortgages, student loans, credit scores, gig work, and “doing what you love.”

Each era’s extraction mechanism is legitimised by the prevailing ideology:

Era	Mechanism	Legitimation
Ancient	Direct slavery, tribute, conquest	Natural order — some are born to rule, others to serve
Feudal	Serfdom, tithes, monarchical tax	Divine right — God ordained the hierarchy
Industrial	Wages, factory time, colonial extraction	Free markets — progress, civilisation, rational self-interest
Modern	Debt currency, housing speculation, work identity	Economic necessity — there is no alternative

The progression is not toward freedom. It is toward *sophistication*. Each new form of extraction is harder to see, easier to internalise, and more difficult to challenge — because each new form convinces the extracted that their condition is natural, earned, or chosen.

A Roman slave knew they were a slave. A medieval serf knew they were a serf. A modern Australian working 50 hours a week to service a mortgage at 14 times their median income, who has been told since childhood that home ownership is the path to security, who would describe themselves as “middle class” and “free” — that person does not know they are a serf. The extraction is invisible precisely because it is total.

The twenty-first century has produced a paradox of abundance and insecurity. Global GDP has more than doubled since 2000, yet economic precarity remains widespread across both developing and developed nations. In the United States, approximately 40% of adults report being unable to cover a \$400 emergency expense (Federal Reserve, 2019). In the European Union, one in five people faces risk of poverty or social exclusion (Eurostat, 2023). Across sub-Saharan Africa, extreme poverty persists despite decades of targeted development interventions. Meanwhile, wealth concentration has reached levels not seen since the Gilded Age, with the top 1% holding more wealth than the bottom 50% of the global population combined (Oxfam, 2023).

This is not a market failure. This is a market *success*. The market is doing exactly what it was designed to do: concentrate. The question is whether we continue to treat this concentration as

natural law — as inevitable as gravity — or whether we recognise it as a *design choice* that can be redesigned.

Against this backdrop, Universal Basic Income — a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all individuals on a universal basis, without means test or work requirement — has re-emerged as a serious policy proposal. But UBI is not merely a welfare program. Understood in historical context, it is the first mechanism in two thousand years that *reverses the direction of extraction*. Instead of flowing from the many to the few, resources flow from the common wealth to every citizen. Instead of requiring compliance, obedience, or performance, it requires only existence. Instead of legitimising hierarchy, it assumes equality.

This paper undertakes two tasks. First, it traces the historical arc of extraction to demonstrate that current economic arrangements are contingent — not natural, not inevitable, not optimal, but simply the latest costume worn by a very old function. Second, it synthesises the global evidence on Universal Basic Income to demonstrate that the alternative is not theoretical. It has been tested. It works. The only thing preventing its implementation is the same thing that prevented the abolition of slavery, the end of serfdom, and the introduction of the weekend: the people who benefit from the current arrangement prefer to keep it.

2. Part I — The Historical Arc of Extraction

2.1 Ancient Extraction: Slavery, Tribute, and Social Death

Before money, there was debt. David Graeber’s *Debt: The First 5000 Years* (2011) demonstrates that credit and obligation preceded coinage by millennia. The earliest Mesopotamian records — clay tablets from Sumer, circa 3500 BCE — are not poems or prayers. They are ledgers. IOUs. Records of who owes what to whom. Debt is the original extraction technology.

Orlando Patterson (1982) defines slavery as “social death” — the complete and permanent removal of a person from their social world, their kinship networks, their legal personhood. The slave exists as property, as tool, as extracted labour in human form. The Roman economy was built on this extraction: at its peak, an estimated 30-40% of the Italian peninsula’s population were enslaved (Scheidel, 2011). The wealth of Rome — its roads, its aqueducts, its legions, its senators’ villas — was produced by people who received nothing for producing it.

The legitimisation was “natural order.” Aristotle argued that some people were “natural slaves” — that their nature suited them for servitude and that slavery was therefore just (*Politics*, Book I). This is the template for every subsequent legitimisation: find a characteristic of the extracted group, declare it innate, and conclude that the extraction is therefore not extraction but the natural order of things.

When Rome took Britain in 43 AD, it replaced tribal kingdoms with imperial administration. Power was localised among Celtic tribes; Rome centralised it. After Rome’s withdrawal circa 410 AD, Germanic settlers formed competing Anglo-Saxon kingdoms — Wessex, Mercia, Northumbria — that eventually unified under powerful kings. Even today, in 2026, there are 92 hereditary peers in the House of Lords. The extraction structures that Rome built did not end when Rome fell. They were inherited, renamed, and continued.

Michael Hudson (2018) traces how debt crises in the ancient world were periodically resolved

through jubilees — mass cancellations of debt that restored social balance. The rulers of Mesopotamia understood something that modern economists have forgotten: that debt, left unchecked, concentrates until it destroys the society that carries it. The jubilee was not charity. It was maintenance. It was the recognition that an economy which extracts without limit will eventually extract itself to death.

We stopped doing jubilees. We kept doing debt.

2.2 Feudal Extraction: Serfdom, Tithes, and Divine Right

The feudal system that emerged across medieval Europe replaced the explicit ownership of persons with a subtler arrangement: the ownership of *land*, with persons attached. The serf was not technically a slave. The serf could not be sold separately from the land. The serf had certain customary rights — to a portion of the harvest, to use of the commons, to protection by the lord in times of war. But the serf could not leave. The serf owed labour — typically three days per week on the lord’s fields, plus additional corvée obligations. The serf owed a portion of their own harvest as tithe and rent. The serf was bound.

Marc Bloch (1961) documented the feudal structure in *Feudal Society*: a layered hierarchy of obligation running from serf to lord to king to God. Each layer extracted from the one below and owed loyalty to the one above. The legitimation was divine right — God had ordained the hierarchy, and to challenge it was not merely illegal but sinful. The medieval Church, which collected its own tithes (typically one-tenth of all produce), reinforced this legitimation from the pulpit every Sunday.

Silvia Federici (2004) in *Caliban and the Witch* documents the transition from feudalism to capitalism as a process of *primitive accumulation* — the systematic destruction of the commons. The enclosure of common lands in England, beginning in the 15th century and accelerating through the 18th, transformed shared resources into private property and transformed self-sufficient peasants into landless workers forced to sell their labour for wages. This was not evolution. It was theft. It was the deliberate destruction of alternatives so that wage labour appeared to be the only option.

The form changed. The function persisted.

2.3 Industrial Extraction: Wages, Clock-Time, and Enclosure

E.P. Thompson’s landmark works — *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963) and “Time, work-discipline, and industrial capitalism” (1967) — document how industrial capitalism imposed a new form of extraction: clock-time discipline. Pre-industrial workers controlled their own time. They worked in bursts, took holidays when they chose, followed agricultural rhythms and seasonal patterns. The factory system required regularity, punctuality, synchronisation. Workers had to be trained — often through violence, fines, and the threat of starvation — to accept that their time was not their own.

The wage, which appeared to be a liberation from serfdom (you are no longer bound to the land; you are free to sell your labour), was in practice a new form of binding. When there is no commons, no subsistence alternative, no way to feed yourself except through wages, the “freedom” to sell your labour is the freedom to choose which master you serve. Marx (1867) called this “the double freedom of the worker” — free from feudal obligation, and free from any means of survival except wage labour. Both freedoms serve the same function: ensuring that labour can be extracted.

Karl Polanyi (1944) in *The Great Transformation* described how the creation of a “self-regulating

market” required the commodification of three things that are not commodities: land, labour, and money. Land is nature. Labour is human activity. Money is a social convention. Treating them as commodities — things produced for sale — distorts and destroys the social fabric. The “self-regulating market” is a utopian project that has never existed in practice and whose pursuit has caused immense human suffering.

Colonial extraction extended the industrial model globally. The wealth that built the factories of Manchester came from cotton picked by enslaved Africans on land stolen from Indigenous Americans, processed in mills staffed by children working 16-hour days. The supply chain of extraction was — and remains — global. The factory worker in Birmingham and the plantation slave in Alabama were links in the same chain, differing in the severity of their extraction but not in its fundamental character.

2.4 Modern Extraction: Debt Currency, Housing, and Work Identity

Richard Werner (2014), in a paper published in the *International Review of Financial Analysis*, empirically demonstrated what heterodox economists had argued for decades: **banks create money out of nothing when they issue loans**. This is not a conspiracy theory. It is an empirical finding published in a peer-reviewed journal and confirmed by the Bank of England’s own publication (McLeay, Radia & Thomas, 2014). When a bank issues a mortgage, it does not lend out depositors’ savings. It creates new money — new purchasing power — by entering numbers into an account. The borrower then spends the next 25-30 years working to repay, with interest, money that was created at the moment of lending at essentially zero cost to the lender.

This is the modern extraction mechanism. It is elegant in its simplicity. The worker goes to work. The worker earns wages. The worker uses those wages to repay debt — primarily mortgage debt, which in Australia now averages \$624,000 (ABS, 2024). The bank created the money at no cost. The worker repays it with decades of labour. The difference between what the bank created (nothing) and what the worker repays (everything) is the extraction.

Thomas Piketty (2014) formalised what the numbers already showed: $r > g$ — the rate of return on capital consistently exceeds the rate of economic growth. This means that those who own capital (property, shares, bonds, businesses) accumulate wealth faster than those who work for wages. Over time, this concentrates wealth inexorably. It is not a market distortion. It is a market *property*. The concentration is the feature, not the bug.

Andrew Sayer (2015) in *Why We Can’t Afford the Rich* distinguishes between wealth creation and wealth extraction. A farmer who grows food creates wealth. A landlord who charges rent on the land the farmer uses extracts wealth. A factory worker who assembles a product creates wealth. A shareholder who receives dividends from the factory extracts wealth. The modern economy has progressively shifted the balance from creation to extraction — from productive activity to rent-seeking, from making things to owning things.

Guy Standing (2011) identifies the emergence of a new economic class: the **precariat** — people who face chronic economic insecurity, unstable employment, lack of occupational identity, and erosion of rights. The precariat is not the old working class. It is a new condition created by the deliberate dismantling of employment protections, union power, and social safety nets that occurred across the developed world from the 1980s onward. The precariat works. The precariat is not lazy. The precariat simply cannot build stability because the rules change constantly and always in favour of those who already have capital.

The modern legitimisation is “economic necessity” — the claim that current arrangements are the only possible arrangements, that markets are natural forces rather than human constructions, that inequality is the price of efficiency, that there is no alternative. Margaret Thatcher said it explicitly: “There is no alternative.” This is the most powerful legitimisation of all, because it does not ask you to accept the hierarchy as just. It asks you to accept it as *inevitable*. It removes the possibility of imagination.

“Do what you love” is the new “serfdom as protection.” The serf was told that the lord’s protection justified the lord’s extraction. The modern worker is told that passion, purpose, and personal brand justify accepting low wages, long hours, no security, and no pension. The extraction is reframed as self-actualisation. The cage is reframed as freedom. And the worker, trained since childhood to seek meaning in work, internalises the reframing so thoroughly that they defend the arrangement against anyone who questions it.

2.5 The Australian Case: A Study in Extraction Under the Southern Cross

Australia provides a particularly vivid case study in modern extraction because it combines extraordinary natural wealth with extraordinary personal debt.

Housing as extraction. The Australian median house price reached approximately \$900,000 in 2024 (ABS, 2024; CoreLogic, 2024), against a median full-time income of approximately \$65,000 (ABS, 2024). This yields a price-to-income ratio of approximately **14:1**. In 1980, the same ratio was approximately **4:1** (RBA, 2024). An Australian buying a home today works 3.5 times longer — relative to their income — than their parents did for an equivalent asset. The additional labour extracted represents not improved housing quality (houses have not improved 3.5-fold) but asset price inflation driven by financialisation, negative gearing, capital gains tax concessions, and the treatment of housing as a speculative asset rather than a place to live.

The mechanisms are specific and traceable:

- **Negative gearing** allows property investors to deduct losses on investment properties against their wage income, effectively subsidising property speculation with public revenue. The Australia Institute (2023) estimates this costs \$13 billion per year in forgone tax revenue — money that flows from wage-earning taxpayers to property investors, who are disproportionately in the top income quintile.
- **Capital gains tax discount** (50% since 1999) makes property speculation more tax-efficient than productive work. A property investor who buys a house, holds it for a year, and sells at a profit pays tax on only half the gain. A worker who earns the same amount through wages pays tax on all of it.
- **Foreign investment**, while subject to some restrictions, has contributed to demand-side inflation in housing markets, particularly in Sydney and Melbourne. Goal 9 of the OMXUS framework — no foreign investment in housing — addresses this directly: houses are for living in, not for speculating on.
- **Superannuation self-managed funds** increasingly flow into property, turning retirement savings into a further engine of housing price inflation.

The result is a system where housing — a basic human need — has been transformed into the primary mechanism of wealth extraction. Young Australians work longer hours at higher productivity than any previous generation and are further from home ownership than any previous generation.

The wealth does not disappear. It flows upward, to existing property owners, to banks that create mortgage debt from nothing, and to a tax system that rewards ownership over labour.

Household debt. Australian household debt reached 190% of disposable income in 2024 (RBA, 2024), among the highest ratios in the developed world. This means the average Australian household owes nearly twice its annual income. The debt is overwhelmingly mortgage debt. Every dollar of that debt was created by a bank at the moment of lending, and every dollar of repayment represents real labour — real hours, real effort, real life — transferred from the borrower to the lender.

Wage stagnation. While Australian GDP per capita has grown substantially since the 1980s, real wages have stagnated for over a decade (ABS, 2024; Productivity Commission, 2023). The gap between productivity growth and wage growth — the share of economic output that goes to workers versus capital — has widened persistently. In the 1970s, the labour share of national income was approximately 60%. By 2024, it had fallen to approximately 51% (ABS, 2024). That 9-percentage-point shift represents approximately \$180 billion per year in national income that flows to capital rather than labour. This is the extraction, quantified.

Work hours. Australia has among the longest working hours in the OECD. One in six employees works 45 hours or more per week (ABS, 2024). The Productivity Commission’s own research shows that hours worked have not declined in proportion to productivity gains — meaning Australians are working as long as their grandparents did, producing several times more per hour, and keeping less of it.

The “lucky country” myth. Donald Horne coined the phrase in 1964 as a *criticism* — “Australia is a lucky country run mainly by second-rate people who share its luck.” It has been misread as a compliment ever since. The luck is mineral wealth. The second-rate management is an extraction system that turns that wealth into private profit while public services deteriorate, infrastructure crumbles, and housing becomes unaffordable. Australia exports \$400 billion in minerals annually (DFAT, 2024). The mining tax debate of 2010 — in which the mining industry spent \$22 million on advertising to defeat a proposed super-profits tax, and succeeded — demonstrates the political infrastructure that protects extraction from democratic interference.

The COVID-19 natural experiment. In March 2020, the Australian government doubled the JobSeeker payment from approximately \$565 to \$1,115 per fortnight in response to the pandemic. This was the closest Australia has come to a basic income supplement. The results mirrored global UBI findings: poverty rates fell significantly (Phillips et al., 2023, ANU Centre for Social Research); food insecurity decreased; mental health improved; recipients reported reduced stress and increased capacity to plan. Domestic violence services reported decreased demand in some regions (AIHW, 2021). When the supplement was removed in March 2021, poverty rates returned to pre-pandemic levels within months. The experiment was involuntary, temporary, and accidental — but its outcomes were consistent with every designed UBI trial on earth.

3. Part II — Literature Review: The UBI Intellectual Tradition

3.1 Historical Development of the UBI Concept

The idea that all members of a polity should receive an unconditional share of common resources has appeared repeatedly across centuries and intellectual traditions. Thomas Paine (1797) argued

in *Agrarian Justice* that every person was owed compensation for the privatisation of land that was originally held in common, proposing a one-time grant at age 21 and an annual pension from age 50. Charles Fourier and Joseph Charlier advanced similar ideas in the nineteenth century, with Charlier (1848) proposing what may be the first explicitly unconditional basic income guarantee.

In the twentieth century, the concept attracted support across the political spectrum. On the left, Bertrand Russell (1918) advocated a basic income sufficient to cover necessities, while on the right, Milton Friedman (1962) proposed a negative income tax — a mechanism that achieves similar distributional outcomes through the tax system. Martin Luther King Jr. (1967) argued that the simplest approach to poverty was “to abolish it directly by a now widely discussed measure: the guaranteed income.” The negative income tax was actually tested in the United States and Canada through a series of experiments in the 1960s and 1970s, including the New Jersey Income Maintenance Experiment (1968–1972), the Rural Income Maintenance Experiment, the Gary Indiana Experiment, and the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment (Mincome, 1974–1979).

The contemporary UBI movement gained momentum in the 1980s with the founding of the Basic Income European Network (later Basic Income Earth Network, BIEN) in 1986. Philippe Van Parijs (1995) provided the most comprehensive philosophical justification in *Real Freedom for All*, arguing that UBI maximises the real freedom of the least advantaged. Guy Standing (2011, 2017) connected UBI to the rise of the precariat — a growing class of workers facing chronic economic insecurity in the era of globalisation and technological disruption.

3.2 Theoretical Arguments For and Against

Proponents advance several theoretical justifications for UBI. The *common ownership* argument holds that natural resources, the accumulated knowledge stock of civilisation, and the productive infrastructure built by prior generations constitute a shared inheritance to which all citizens have a claim (Paine, 1797; Van Parijs, 1995). The *freedom* argument maintains that genuine autonomy requires a material foundation; without economic security, formal freedoms of speech, association, and occupation are hollow for those struggling to survive (Standing, 2017). The *efficiency* argument contends that unconditional transfers eliminate the administrative overhead, perverse incentives (benefits cliffs, poverty traps), and stigma associated with means-tested welfare systems (Murray, 2006). The *technological disruption* argument, given new urgency by advances in artificial intelligence, warns that automation will displace significant portions of the workforce and that UBI provides a mechanism for distributing the gains from increased productivity (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Yang, 2018).

Critics raise correspondingly diverse objections. The *work disincentive* critique argues that unconditional income will reduce labour supply, undermining productive capacity (Mankiw, 2017). The *inflation* critique holds that distributing cash universally will drive up prices, particularly in supply-constrained sectors like housing, eroding the real value of transfers (Cowen, 2017). The *fiscal* critique questions whether any funding mechanism can sustainably finance payments at a meaningful level (Greenstein, 2019). The *dependency* critique contends that unconditional support erodes initiative, self-reliance, and the work ethic (Mead, 1986). The *targeting* critique argues that a given budget produces greater poverty reduction when concentrated on the poorest rather than distributed universally (Hanna & Olken, 2018). And the *political* critique suggests that UBI, once established, would be perpetually vulnerable to political attack or capture (Rothstein, 1998).

The strength of this paper’s contribution lies in evaluating these theoretical arguments against the growing body of empirical evidence from actual implementations.

4. Methodology

This study employs a comparative case study approach (Yin, 2018) to analyse global UBI implementations and related unconditional cash transfer programs, embedded within a historical analysis of economic extraction mechanisms.

Part I uses historical comparative analysis drawing on primary economic histories (Graeber, 2011; Bloch, 1961; Thompson, 1963, 1967; Federici, 2004), empirical banking studies (Werner, 2014; McLeay et al., 2014), and statistical sources (ABS, 2024; RBA, 2024; CoreLogic, 2024) to trace the functional continuity of extraction across eras.

Parts III–IX employ the comparative case study methodology. Cases were selected based on four criteria: (1) the program provides regular, unconditional cash payments to individuals or households; (2) sufficient documentation exists regarding program design and outcomes; (3) the cases collectively represent diversity in geographic context, funding mechanism, payment level, population coverage, and research design; and (4) the program has been subject to some form of evaluation, whether through randomised controlled trials, quasi-experimental methods, or systematic observational data.

We classify cases into four categories based on their design characteristics:

- **Permanent universal programs:** Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend, Macau Wealth Par-taking Scheme
- **Large-scale pilot programs with formal research designs:** Finland Basic Income Ex-periment, Ontario Basic Income Pilot, Stockton SEED, GiveDirectly Kenya
- **Targeted programs with UBI elements:** Marica Citizens’ Basic Income, Namibia Basic Income Grant, Madhya Pradesh SEWA-UNICEF Trial
- **Partial or quasi-UBI implementations:** Iran Subsidy Reform, Cherokee Casino Dividend, Australia COVID-19 JobSeeker supplement

For each case, we document: (a) program parameters (location, duration, population, amount, fund-ing, conditionality); (b) research design and methodology; (c) measured outcomes across domains (employment, health, education, poverty, community effects); and (d) implementation lessons re-garding administration, political sustainability, and scalability.

Cross-case analysis follows the method of analytic generalisation (Yin, 2018), identifying patterns that recur across contexts. A key limitation is that no single case provides a complete model for national-scale UBI implementation. Our analysis addresses this through triangulation across cases and explicit discussion of generalisability constraints.

5. Part III — The Global Evidence: What Happens When You Stop Extracting

5.1 Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (1982–Present)

The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) is the world’s longest-running universal cash dividend program. Established in 1982, the program distributes annual payments to all Alaska residents who

have lived in the state for at least one full calendar year. The program covers approximately 700,000 residents and requires no means test or behavioural requirements. Payments vary annually based on the investment performance of the Alaska Permanent Fund, a sovereign wealth fund capitalised from oil royalties, typically ranging from \$1,000 to \$2,000 per person per year. The peak payment was \$2,072 in 2015; the lowest in recent years was \$992 in 2012.

Outcomes. Jones and Marinescu (2018), in a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper, found **no negative effect on aggregate employment** from the dividend. They documented a **17% increase in part-time work**, suggesting that the dividend facilitated labour market flexibility rather than withdrawal. This finding directly contradicts the work disincentive hypothesis using data from the only permanent, universal cash transfer program in a developed country.

Chung et al. (2016) found that the PFD was associated with **increased birth weights and improved infant health outcomes**. Berman and Reamey (2016) documented a **20% reduction in poverty among rural Indigenous communities**. Goldsmith (2010) identified strengthened social ties and increased community stability. ISER (2016) estimated that the dividend **generates approximately 10,000 jobs** through multiplier effects of increased consumer spending.

Political sustainability. The PFD enjoys **over 90% approval ratings** across the political spectrum, making it one of the most popular government programs in American history. The program is framed as a **dividend from common ownership** — citizens’ rightful share of Alaska’s oil wealth — rather than as welfare or government assistance. This framing resonates across partisan lines. The endowment funding model provides institutional insulation from normal budget processes. Universality creates a broad constituency with a stake in the program’s continuation.

The PFD demonstrates that a universal cash dividend can operate for over four decades with high administrative efficiency, strong public support, and no measurable negative effects on employment or inflation.

5.2 Finland Basic Income Experiment (2017–2018)

Finland conducted the first nationwide randomised controlled trial of basic income in a developed country. Running from January 2017 to December 2018, the experiment randomly selected **2,000 unemployed individuals aged 25–58** from the national unemployment register to receive **EUR 560 per month** (approximately USD 635), tax-free, with no behavioural requirements.

Results. The final evaluation report (Kangas et al., 2020) found a **small positive effect on employment**, with recipients working an average of **six more days per year** than the control group. The most striking findings were in subjective well-being: recipients reported **significantly higher financial security, improved mental health, and greater confidence** in their future. They were **17% more likely to report feeling “very little stress”** compared to the control group. Recipients also reported **increased trust in institutions and other people** and higher overall life satisfaction.

Limitations. The sample was restricted to unemployed individuals, making it impossible to assess effects on the broader population. The payment amount was below Finland’s poverty line, testing a partial rather than full basic income. The two-year duration may have been insufficient for long-term life changes. A change in government during the trial affected its continuation.

Despite limitations, Finland provided the most methodologically rigorous evidence to date from a

developed-country context, demonstrating that unconditional cash does not reduce work effort and produces meaningful improvements in well-being and social trust.

5.3 Ontario Basic Income Pilot (2017–2019)

The Ontario Basic Income Pilot enrolled approximately **4,000 low-income individuals** across three communities beginning in 2017. Payments were set at **CAD \$16,989 per year for individuals and \$24,027 for couples**, reduced by 50 cents for each dollar of earned income.

Early Results. Though terminated after approximately 18 months: **83% of participants reported better physical health. 79% reported improved mental health. 33% returned to education or training. 44% continued working** while receiving basic income. Housing stability improved significantly.

Political termination. Cancelled in 2019 by the newly elected Progressive Conservative government of Doug Ford, despite promising results and before formal evaluation could be completed. The Ontario experience underscores the importance of institutional design features — constitutional protections, independent governance structures, broad political coalitions — that insulate programs from electoral cycles.

5.4 Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration (SEED, 2019–2021)

SEED was the first mayor-led guaranteed income pilot in the United States, launched by Mayor Michael Tubbs in February 2019. The program provided **\$500 per month** in unconditional cash to **125 residents** of Stockton, California, delivered via prepaid debit cards. The program employed a **randomised controlled trial** design.

Results. Full-time employment among recipients increased from 28% to 40% — a 12-percentage-point gain significantly exceeding the control group (West et al., 2021). Recipients used financial stability to search for better employment, invest in training, and transition from precarious gig work to stable positions.

Financial stability improved substantially. Mental health outcomes were significant: **reduced anxiety and depression, increased energy and well-being.**

Less than 1% of disbursements were spent on alcohol or tobacco. The vast majority went to food (approximately 40%), merchandise and retail, utilities, and auto-related expenses. This finding contradicts the persistent assumption that unconditional cash will be “wasted.”

SEED catalysed a national movement: the Mayors for a Guaranteed Income network grew to include **over 80 U.S. mayors** from diverse political backgrounds.

5.5 GiveDirectly Kenya (2017–Ongoing)

GiveDirectly’s basic income experiment in rural Kenya is the **largest and longest UBI study in a developing country**. Launched in 2017 with a planned duration of **12 years**, the study encompasses **over 20,000 individuals across 295 villages**. The research design is a **randomised controlled trial with three treatment arms**: short-term transfers (2 years), long-term transfers (12 years), and equivalent lump sum. Each adult receives approximately **\$0.75 per day**, representing roughly **50% of average local income**.

Payments are delivered via **M-Pesa** with approximately **90% of total funds reaching recipients directly** — overhead of only 10%, comparing favourably with the 10–20% typical of means-tested welfare programs in developed countries.

Preliminary results show recipients have **increased assets, enterprise formation, and total income**, suggesting unconditional cash functions as investment capital. Psychological well-being, food security, and health outcomes have all improved. Researchers have documented **positive spillover effects to non-recipient households**, indicating community-wide benefits through local economic circulation.

The study’s multi-arm design will answer a question no other study can: **how do the effects of short-term, long-term, and lump-sum transfers differ?**

5.6 Cherokee Casino Dividend (1996–Present)

The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians began distributing casino profits to all tribal members in 1996 — approximately **\$4,000–\$6,000 per person annually**, unconditionally. This constitutes a natural experiment, as longitudinal studies already tracking child development in the region (the Great Smoky Mountains Study) measured outcomes before and after.

Outcomes. Akee et al. (2010, 2018) found improved educational attainment and reduced behavioural problems. By adulthood, children who grew up receiving the dividend showed a **22% reduction in criminal offences** (Akee et al., 2016). Costello et al. (2010) documented a **40% reduction in psychiatric disorders** among children in families that moved out of poverty. Parent-child relationships improved. Parental supervision increased. There was **no increase in substance abuse**; some cohorts showed reductions.

The Cherokee case is significant because it provides **long-term, longitudinal evidence** spanning decades. The child development findings demonstrate that **the effects of unconditional cash are intergenerational**: economic security during childhood produces lasting improvements that persist into adulthood. This is the economic proof of the prevention principle: when material conditions improve, the pathologies attributed to individual failure disappear without any intervention targeting individuals.

5.7 Additional Cases

5.7.1 Macau Wealth Partaking Scheme (2008–Present)

Macau distributes annual payments to all permanent residents (approximately 650,000 people): **\$1,200 for permanent residents and \$700 for non-permanent residents**, funded by gaming tax revenue surpluses. The program has maintained **90%+ approval ratings**, generated no measurable negative impact on labour force participation, and functioned as an automatic economic stabiliser during downturns.

5.7.2 Iran Subsidy Reform (2010–Present)

Iran’s quasi-UBI initially covered **96% of the population (approximately 75 million people)** with payments of **\$40–\$45 per person per month**, representing **29% of median household income** — the largest UBI-type program ever implemented. Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzoeei (2018) found **no negative effect on labour supply**, with a slight increase in service-sector

employment. Poverty rates declined. The Gini coefficient decreased by **0.1 points**. Observed inflation was primarily attributable to sanctions and subsidy removal rather than the cash transfers, as confirmed by IMF analysis.

5.7.3 Namibia Basic Income Grant (2008–2009)

In Otjivero-Omitara, a coalition of churches, unions, and NGOs provided **N\$100 per month (approximately US \$12.40)** to all residents below age 60 (approximately 1,000 people). Despite the extremely modest payment: **household poverty fell from 76% to 37%. Child malnutrition dropped from 42% to 10%. Economic activity increased by 29%** in earned income. **School attendance rose to nearly 100%. Crime rates fell by 42%.**

Even very small unconditional transfers produce transformative effects in contexts of extreme deprivation.

5.7.4 Marica Citizens' Basic Income (2013–Present)

The Brazilian municipality of Marica provides **130 mumbucas per month** (local digital currency worth approximately US \$25) to **42,000 residents**, funded by oil royalties. The use of a **digital local currency** ensures transfers circulate within the local economy. Results include a **40% increase in local business activity**, poverty reduction from **42% to 33%**, increased school enrolment, and enhanced pandemic resilience.

5.8 India: Madhya Pradesh and Sikkim

5.8.1 Madhya Pradesh SEWA-UNICEF Pilot (2011–2012)

The Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) and UNICEF conducted a basic income pilot in Madhya Pradesh, providing monthly cash transfers to every individual in eight villages (approximately 6,000 people), with twelve comparison villages. Each adult received **200 rupees per month** (later raised to 300), and each child received **100 rupees per month** (later 150).

Outcomes (Standing, 2013; Davala et al., 2015): - **Nutrition improved** — families spent more on fruit, vegetables, meat, and eggs, and less on subsidised grains from the public distribution system - **Children's school attendance increased**, particularly for girls. School performance improved. - **Health spending shifted** from government hospitals to private clinics — recipients exercised choice rather than accepting whatever was free - **Productive work increased** — own-account work and small business formation rose significantly. Labour for wages did not decline. - **Women's economic agency increased** — women were more likely to engage in own-account work and to make independent spending decisions - **Debt levels decreased** — households reduced dependence on moneylenders, who charge extortionate rates in rural India - **Inclusion of marginalised groups** — Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes showed improvements equal to or greater than the general population

The Madhya Pradesh pilot is particularly significant because it tested UBI in a context of extreme poverty, caste-based discrimination, and patriarchal social structures — and demonstrated positive outcomes across all of these dimensions.

5.8.2 Sikkim UBI Proposal

The Indian state of Sikkim (population approximately 700,000) announced plans in 2019 to become the first jurisdiction in the world to implement a full universal basic income at the state level. While implementation was delayed by the pandemic, the commitment represents the most ambitious government-level UBI initiative in Asia. Sikkim’s small, geographically contained population and existing state capacity make it an ideal test case for national-level implementation.

5.9 Australia: COVID-19 Supplements and the Natural Experiment

Australia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic created an inadvertent natural experiment in unconditional cash transfers that is directly relevant to the Australian implementation pathway.

In March 2020, the federal government introduced the **Coronavirus Supplement**, which effectively doubled the JobSeeker payment from approximately **\$565 to \$1,115 per fortnight** (approximately \$1,185 AUD per fortnight at peak, equivalent to roughly \$550 AUD per week). The supplement was available to all JobSeeker recipients without additional means testing or behavioural requirements beyond existing eligibility. At its peak, approximately **1.6 million Australians** received the enhanced payment (DSS, 2021).

Outcomes:

- **Poverty reduction.** Phillips et al. (2023) at the ANU Centre for Social Research and Methods found that the supplement reduced poverty rates among recipients by approximately **30–50%**, depending on the measure used. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation equivalent analysis (ACOSS, 2020) found that the enhanced payment lifted the majority of recipients above the poverty line for the first time.
- **Food security.** ACOSS (2020) and Foodbank Australia (2021) reported significant improvements in food security among recipients, with reduced reliance on food banks and emergency food relief during the period of enhanced payments.
- **Mental health.** Multiple surveys (Beyond Blue, 2021; AIHW, 2021) documented that despite the stress of the pandemic itself, JobSeeker recipients reported improvements in mental health attributable to the increased payment — reduced financial stress was the most commonly cited mechanism.
- **Housing stability.** The National Shelter survey (2020) found that recipients were better able to meet rent payments and maintain housing during the supplement period. Eviction moratoriums also contributed, but the income effect was independently significant.
- **Spending patterns.** Analysis by the Melbourne Institute (2021) found that recipients spent the additional income on essentials — food, rent, utilities, healthcare, and debt repayment — mirroring spending patterns from international UBI trials.
- **Reversal effects.** When the supplement was progressively reduced from September 2020 and fully removed by March 2021, the improvements reversed rapidly. Poverty rates returned to pre-pandemic levels. Food bank demand surged. Mental health indicators deteriorated. The natural experiment demonstrated both that the income effect was real and that its benefits were contingent on continuation.

The Australian COVID-19 supplement is not a designed UBI trial and has important differences (it was tied to existing welfare eligibility, it was temporary by design, and it occurred during a pandemic

that introduced confounding variables). But its outcomes — poverty reduction, improved health, responsible spending, reversal on removal — are perfectly consistent with the global evidence base. The supplement demonstrates that **Australia’s existing administrative infrastructure can deliver enhanced unconditional payments** at scale, immediately, using existing systems.

6. Part IV — Cross-Case Analysis

6.1 Employment and Labour Supply

The most persistent objection to UBI — that it would cause people to stop working — is contradicted by evidence from every major implementation:

- **Alaska** (40+ years): No employment reduction; 17% increase in part-time work
- **Finland** (RCT): Small positive employment effect (6 additional working days per year)
- **Stockton** (RCT): 12-percentage-point increase in full-time employment (28% → 40%)
- **Iran** (75 million people): No labour supply reduction; slight increase in service-sector employment
- **Manitoba/Mincome** (1974–1979): Reductions only among new mothers and students
- **India/Madhya Pradesh**: Increased own-account work and small business formation
- **Australia COVID-19**: No evidence of mass workforce withdrawal during supplement period

The consistent finding across contexts, continents, cultures, and payment levels is that UBI changes the *quality* and *type* of work people do rather than whether they work at all. Recipients transition to better-matched employment, invest in education and training, start businesses, and provide caregiving that the market does not compensate.

6.2 Health Outcomes

Health improvements appear across virtually every implementation, regardless of context or payment level:

- **Alaska**: Improved infant health and birth weights
- **Ontario**: 83% better physical health, 79% better mental health
- **Finland**: 17% less stress
- **Stockton**: Reduced anxiety and depression
- **Cherokee**: 40% reduction in child psychiatric disorders
- **Namibia**: Child malnutrition from 42% to 10%
- **India**: Improved nutrition, health spending shifted to choice-based care
- **Australia**: Improved mental health during supplement; deterioration on removal

The mechanisms are multiple: improved nutrition through food security, reduced chronic stress from economic uncertainty, improved housing stability, greater access to preventive care, and the cognitive benefits of not being perpetually preoccupied with financial survival. These findings are consistent with the broader public health literature establishing socioeconomic status as the most powerful determinant of health outcomes (Marmot, 2004).

6.3 Education

Multiple programs show increased educational engagement: Ontario (33% returned to education), Namibia (attendance near 100%), Cherokee (improved attainment), Marica (increased enrolment), India (improved attendance and performance, especially for girls). Economic security removes the financial pressures that force individuals to forgo education for immediate income.

6.4 Poverty and Inequality

UBI programs consistently reduce poverty and inequality: Alaska (20% poverty reduction among rural Indigenous communities), Namibia (76% → 37%), Marica (42% → 33%), Iran (Gini decreased 0.1 points), Australia COVID-19 (30–50% poverty reduction among recipients). While equal dollar amounts may appear regressive at first glance, they are inherently progressive in percentage-of-income terms: \$800 per week represents a vastly larger proportional impact on a \$20,000 income than on a \$200,000 income.

6.5 Inflation

The inflation objection is perhaps the most commonly raised economic concern, yet empirical evidence provides remarkably little support. Alaska has distributed dividends for over 40 years with no measurable inflationary impact (Goldsmith, 2012). Macau’s 15-year program has not generated systemic inflation. Iran’s observed inflation was driven by sanctions and subsidy removal, not cash transfers (IMF analysis). UBI funded through redistribution does not increase the money supply; it reallocates existing purchasing power.

6.6 Spending Patterns

Evidence consistently shows responsible spending. Stockton: less than 1% on alcohol/tobacco, majority on food, utilities, merchandise. GiveDirectly: investment in productive assets, enterprise, education, housing. Cherokee: no increase in substance abuse. India: improved nutrition, debt reduction. Australia: essentials (food, rent, utilities, healthcare, debt). The persistent belief that “people will waste it” is unsupported by data from any major implementation.

6.7 Community Effects

UBI programs appear to strengthen social bonds rather than undermine them. Alaska’s dividend creates shared identity. Namibia enhanced community cohesion. Cherokee strengthened community stability and reduced crime by 22%. Marica’s local currency reinforced local economic circulation. India showed increased community cooperation. Universal programs avoid the social division created by means-tested systems that categorise people into “deserving” and “undeserving.”

7. Part V — Addressing Criticisms

7.1 “UBI Would Reduce Work Participation”

Refuted across every implementation. See Section 6.1. The theoretical explanation integrates the income effect with countervailing forces: improved job matching, elimination of benefits cliffs, enhanced bargaining power, increased entrepreneurial risk-taking, and the psychological research

showing that autonomy and purpose — not financial desperation — drive sustained productive engagement (Deci & Ryan, 2000).

7.2 “UBI Would Cause Significant Inflation”

Four decades of evidence from Alaska, 15 years from Macau, and the Iranian experience all fail to support this objection. UBI funded through wealth redistribution or sovereign wealth fund returns does not increase the money supply. Phased implementation allows supply-side adaptation. Complementary policies (housing supply expansion, anti-monopoly enforcement) address sector-specific risks.

7.3 “UBI Is Too Expensive”

The cost objection reflects a framing choice rather than an economic constraint. Current welfare administration consumes 10–20% of program budgets in overhead. The economic costs of poverty — healthcare, criminal justice, lost productivity — are enormous; McKinsey estimates the United States loses \$700 billion annually from achievement gaps driven by economic insecurity alone. Cash transfers produce local economic multipliers of 1.5–2.8 (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2016). The “cost” of UBI must be weighed against the cost of *not* having it.

In Australia specifically: the Nineteen Trillion paper (Paper 02 in this series) demonstrates that Australia’s combined public and private wealth exceeds \$19 trillion. A UBI of \$800/week for all adults — approximately \$510 billion per year — represents 2.7% of that wealth. The existing welfare system costs approximately \$195 billion per year (DSS, 2024). The incremental cost, offset by administrative savings, multiplier effects, reduced healthcare, criminal justice, and social costs, is within the fiscal capacity of the nation by any reasonable analysis.

7.4 “UBI Creates Dependency”

Contradicted by every implementation. GiveDirectly recipients invested in productive assets. Stockton recipients pursued education, reduced debt, made long-term plans. Cherokee children showed improved outcomes into adulthood. India showed increased own-account work and reduced reliance on moneylenders. The psychological research is clear: security is a prerequisite for self-actualisation, not an obstacle to it (Maslow, 1943). Economic scarcity impairs cognitive function and decision-making (Mani et al., 2013). What the dependency critique calls “self-reliance” often requires a foundation of stability that current systems fail to provide.

7.5 “UBI Would Increase Inequality”

A uniform payment is inherently progressive in percentage terms. \$800/week increases a \$20,000 annual income by 208% but a \$200,000 income by only 20.8%. Empirical confirmation: Iran (decreased Gini), Alaska (disproportionate benefit to rural and low-income residents), GiveDirectly (decreased within-community inequality). Progressive funding mechanisms make the net distributional impact strongly equalising.

7.6 “UBI Undermines the Value of Work”

This objection rests on a narrow definition of work that recognises only market labour. UBI recipients consistently engage in socially valuable activities: caregiving, community service, education,

volunteering, creative work. UBI enhances the meaning of work by separating survival from employment, enabling people to choose work that aligns with their capacities and values rather than accepting any available position out of desperation.

7.7 “UBI Would Be Vulnerable to Political Cuts”

Alaska’s constitutional protection has preserved the program for 40+ years. Social Security — another universal cash benefit — has proven extraordinarily durable precisely because of its universality. Key design features: constitutional protection, universal eligibility, independent professional management, framing as a right or dividend. Targeted programs are more politically vulnerable than universal ones because they have narrower constituencies.

7.8 “Employers Would Reduce Wages”

Evidence shows the opposite. Stockton recipients secured better jobs with higher pay. Finland participants reported improved bargaining positions. Alaska’s implementation coincides with higher-than-average wages. UBI increases workers’ reservation wage — the minimum compensation for which they will accept employment — forcing employers to compete on wages and conditions.

7.9 “UBI Is Culturally Specific to Western Individualism”

Successful implementations span Kenya, Namibia, India, Iran, Brazil, Alaska (including Indigenous communities), Macau, and Finland. Namibia’s program strengthened communal structures. Marica’s currency reinforced community circulation. India’s pilot showed benefits across caste lines. Economic security is a universal human need.

7.10 “UBI Would Undermine Social Insurance Programs”

No successful implementation has replaced social insurance with UBI. Alaska maintains normal social programs alongside the PFD. Finland maintained unemployment insurance. The appropriate design positions UBI as a universal floor complementing income-proportional social insurance.

8. Part VI — Funding Mechanisms

8.1 Resource Royalties and Common Asset Returns

Alaska (oil royalties, 40+ years), Macau (gaming tax), Marica (oil royalties), Iran (energy subsidy savings). The common thread is the *public ownership* framing: natural resources belong to all citizens, and dividends represent a return on common wealth. This framing avoids political resistance associated with taxation and generates durable support.

For Australia, this pathway is immediately available. The mining sector generates approximately \$400 billion in annual revenue (DFAT, 2024). Current mining royalties and taxes capture a fraction of this value. A resource rent that captured even 10% of mining revenue would generate \$40 billion per year — enough to fund a partial UBI or significantly enhance existing payments.

8.2 Sovereign Wealth Funds

The sovereign wealth fund model — exemplified by Alaska’s Permanent Fund, Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (\$1.6 trillion, the world’s largest), and the proposed Sovereign Equity Fund architecture (Astor, 2026) — aggregates public assets into a professionally managed portfolio that generates returns for distribution. Norway’s fund, built from oil revenue, returns approximately 3% per year — roughly \$48 billion. If Australia had established a similar fund from mining revenues at any point in the past 50 years, the returns alone would now fund a meaningful UBI.

Key design features include diversification across asset classes, a dividend corridor (40–60% of realised net cash flows), smoothing buffers (12–18 weeks of distributions in reserve), and governance combining professional fiduciary management with citizen oversight.

8.3 Tax Reform

Carbon taxes, land value taxes (following Henry George, 1879), financial transaction taxes, and wealth taxes have all been proposed as UBI funding sources. These simultaneously address other policy objectives (emissions reduction, land speculation, financial instability, wealth concentration). The Henry Tax Review (2010) in Australia recommended a broader resource rent tax and land tax — recommendations that were politically defeated but remain economically sound.

8.4 Subsidy Redirection

Iran demonstrated the viability of funding UBI through elimination of regressive subsidies. In Australia, negative gearing (\$13 billion/year) and the capital gains tax discount (\$12 billion/year) are regressive subsidies that flow disproportionately to the wealthy. Redirecting these alone would generate \$25 billion per year.

8.5 Economic Multiplier Offsets

Cash transfers to lower-income recipients produce local economic multipliers of 1.5–2.8 (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2016). Alaska’s dividend generates approximately 10,000 jobs through consumer spending. These multiplier effects produce additional tax revenue, reduced safety-net demand, and improved productivity that partially offset gross costs.

8.6 Combined Funding Architecture

No single mechanism need bear the full cost. An Australian UBI could be funded through a combination of:

Source	Estimated Annual Yield
Enhanced mining royalties / resource rent	\$40–80 billion
Negative gearing reform	\$13 billion
Capital gains tax discount reform	\$12 billion
Administrative savings from welfare simplification	\$10–15 billion
Carbon pricing	\$10–20 billion
Land value tax (modest rate)	\$15–25 billion
Multiplier-driven tax revenue increase	\$15–30 billion
Total potential	\$115–195 billion

Combined with existing welfare expenditure of approximately \$195 billion, total available resources approach \$310–390 billion — sufficient to fund a meaningful UBI for all Australian adults.

9. Part VII — The Australian Implementation Pathway

9.1 Why Australia

Australia is uniquely positioned for UBI implementation for several reasons:

1. **Mineral wealth.** Australia is the world’s largest exporter of iron ore, one of the largest exporters of coal, gas, lithium, and rare earths. This wealth currently flows primarily to private shareholders (many foreign). A resource rent redirecting a portion to citizens — the Alaska model — is the most politically viable pathway.
2. **Existing administrative infrastructure.** Centrelink, the Australian Government’s welfare delivery agency, already processes payments to millions of Australians. The COVID-19 supplement demonstrated that enhanced payments can be delivered through existing systems at scale, immediately.
3. **Small population.** At approximately 26 million people (ABS, 2024), Australia’s population is smaller than many cities. The fiscal challenge of universal payments is proportionally smaller than for larger nations.
4. **High GDP per capita.** Australia’s GDP per capita is among the highest in the world (approximately \$65,000 USD). The nation has the economic capacity to provide economic security to all citizens; the question is distribution, not production.
5. **The COVID-19 precedent.** The Coronavirus Supplement proved that Australians do not stop working, do not “waste” money, and do experience measurable improvements in health, housing, and well-being when receiving enhanced unconditional payments. This is not hypothetical. It happened. It was measured. It worked.

9.2 Design Parameters

Based on the global evidence and Australian context:

- **Amount:** \$800 per week per adult (\$41,600/year), approximately 64% of median full-time income. This level would eliminate absolute poverty and provide genuine economic security. For context, the current JobSeeker rate of approximately \$762 per fortnight (\$381/week) is widely acknowledged as below the poverty line.
- **Universality:** All Australian residents aged 18+, regardless of income, employment status, or other characteristics. Universality is essential for political durability, administrative simplicity, and the elimination of stigma.
- **Unconditional:** No means test, no activity test, no mutual obligation requirements. The evidence is unambiguous: unconditional transfers produce better outcomes than conditional ones.
- **Payment infrastructure:** Direct bank deposit (default), with mobile and card-based alternatives for the unbanked. Existing Centrelink infrastructure can be adapted.

- **Interaction with existing programs:** UBI operates as a universal floor. Medicare, disability support, aged care, and other specific-need programs continue. The existing welfare bureaucracy can be progressively simplified as UBI absorbs functions currently performed by JobSeeker, Youth Allowance, and other income-support payments.

9.3 Phased Implementation

Phase 1 — Foundation (Year 1–2): - Legislative framework development - Sovereign wealth fund establishment (initial capitalisation from mining revenue reallocation) - Pilot deployment in 3–5 diverse communities (urban, rural, regional, Indigenous) - Independent evaluation framework established

Phase 2 — Pilot (Year 2–4): - State-level rollout in one or two states - Monitoring: inflation, employment, health, education, crime, community cohesion - Design parameter adjustment based on observed outcomes - Building political coalition through demonstrated results

Phase 3 — National Scale (Year 4–7): - National legislation with constitutional protection for the sovereign wealth fund - Full rollout to all Australian adults - Progressive simplification of existing welfare system - International coordination (sharing data, methodology, lessons)

10. Part VIII — Communication and Political Feasibility

10.1 The Framing Problem

UBI’s political viability depends substantially on framing. Messages presenting UBI as an *economic right* or *common ownership dividend* outperform those framing it as *welfare* or *government assistance*. Alaska’s PFD achieves 90%+ approval because it is understood as citizens’ rightful share of oil wealth. The word “dividend” does work that “benefit” cannot: it implies ownership, earned return, and shared prosperity rather than dependency or charity.

In Australia, the most powerful framing is: **“It’s your mineral wealth. You should get a dividend.”** Australia’s mining industry extracts and exports the nation’s common resources. Every Australian has an ownership claim on those resources. A citizen’s dividend is not a handout — it is a return on assets that already belong to you.

10.2 Cross-Partisan Appeals

For progressive audiences: economic justice, poverty elimination, shared prosperity, gender equality (UBI recognises unpaid care work).

For conservative and libertarian audiences: individual freedom, reduced bureaucracy, elimination of welfare traps, personal responsibility enabled by genuine choice.

For business audiences: consumer purchasing power, entrepreneurial risk-taking, workforce adaptability, reduced social costs that currently burden the economy.

For rural and regional audiences: the Alaska model — resource wealth staying in the communities that produce it, rather than flowing to corporate headquarters in Sydney and London.

For the “I am my own man” audience — the demographic this research series exists to reach: **Nobody tells you what to do. Not your boss, not Centrelink, not a politician. You get your dividend. You choose how to live. That’s freedom. Everything else is just serfdom with better furniture.**

10.3 Evidence Communication

Concrete examples and personal stories outperform abstract statistics. Stockton SEED’s use of participant narratives proved more effective at shifting public opinion than its quantitative findings. Simple analogies help: comparing UBI to public infrastructure (roads, schools) that everyone uses, or to shareholder dividends. Proactive misconception addressing prevents defensive reactions: leading with “you might wonder whether people would stop working — here’s what 40 years of evidence from Alaska shows” is more effective than waiting for the objection.

10.4 Building Political Durability

Universality creates a broad constituency. Constitutional protection insulates funding. Independent governance reduces political capture. Transparent dashboards and public reporting make it difficult to argue the program is wasteful. Gradual expansion from pilot to national builds evidence, infrastructure, and political support incrementally.

11. Part IX — Design Considerations

11.1 Payment Amount

Even modest amounts produce significant effects, but higher payments enable more transformative outcomes. The relationship between amount and impact is not linear: there are threshold effects where crossing certain income levels (particularly poverty lines) produces disproportionate benefits. Design should target an amount sufficient to provide genuine economic security while remaining fiscally sustainable.

11.2 Universality Versus Targeting

The evidence strongly favours universality. Universal programs achieve higher political sustainability, lower administrative costs, greater participation rates, and reduced stigma. Targeting requires means tests that create administrative burden, benefits cliffs, perverse incentives, and political vulnerability. When UBI is funded by progressive mechanisms, high-income individuals are net contributors despite receiving the payment.

11.3 Payment Infrastructure

Multiple viable delivery mechanisms exist: direct bank deposits (low overhead), digital currency (local circulation, reaches unbanked), mobile money (rural accessibility), prepaid cards (unbanked populations). The optimal design combines multiple payment rails for universal accessibility.

11.4 Conditionality and Behavioural Requirements

All successful UBI implementations share unconditional payments with no behavioural requirements. Unconditional transfers reduce administrative costs, eliminate compliance burden, preserve dignity, and avoid perverse incentives (such as discouraging work to maintain eligibility).

11.5 Institutional Governance

Long-term sustainability requires governance structures that protect the program from political interference while maintaining democratic accountability. The Sovereign Equity Fund architecture (Astor, 2026) proposes: professional fiduciaries for portfolio management, elected citizen stewards for oversight, rotating citizen panels for transparency, independent red teams for stress testing, and public dashboards with real-time reporting.

12. Discussion and Limitations

12.1 Strength of the Evidence Base

The accumulated evidence from global UBI implementations constitutes a substantial and growing body of knowledge. The diversity of contexts — from sub-Saharan Africa to Scandinavia, from Indigenous communities to megacities, from two-year pilots to four-decade permanent programs — strengthens confidence in findings that recur across cases. The use of randomised controlled trials in several implementations provides causal evidence less vulnerable to selection bias.

12.2 Limitations

Scale limitations. No existing implementation combines full universality, a payment level above the poverty line, and permanent duration at a national scale. Alaska is universal and permanent but modest. Finland and Stockton were temporary. Iran was massive but modest in amount. Extrapolating to full-scale national UBI requires caution about emergent systemic effects.

Duration limitations. Most pilots ran two years or less, potentially too short for long-term decisions (multi-year education, business formation, career transitions). GiveDirectly's 12-year study will partially address this.

Context limitations. Each case reflects its specific economic, political, and cultural context. While consistency across diverse contexts is encouraging, particularities shape outcomes in ways comparative analysis cannot fully control.

Measurement limitations. Self-reported outcomes are subject to bias. Employment data may not capture informal work. Short follow-up periods miss intergenerational effects.

Political economy limitations. Ontario illustrates that promising programs can be terminated for political reasons before evidence matures. The ability to generate evidence is itself contingent on political sustainability.

Historical analysis limitations. The extraction framework in Part I is a deliberate analytical lens. Alternative interpretations of economic history exist and deserve engagement. The argument is not that extraction is the *only* function of economic systems, but that it is a *persistent* function that has been insufficiently recognised and inadequately addressed.

12.3 Areas for Future Research

How do UBI effects vary by payment level — are there threshold effects? How do temporary and permanent programs differ? What are the macroeconomic equilibrium effects at national scale? How do different funding mechanisms affect distributional properties? What governance structures most effectively balance accountability with insulation from political capture? And specifically for Australia: what would the interaction effects be between UBI and the existing superannuation, Medicare, and housing systems?

13. Conclusion: The Form Changes, the Function Persists — Unless You Change the Function

Every group that came before us made one mistake that becomes ridiculously obvious as soon as we switch on our brain: they defined a “them.” Tell me one culture, one people, any tribe, who hasn’t defined a “them.” Stop looking for morals. Stop thinking people are ever bad. They’re not. You’re not. When you believe it, we can get started and fix this thing to be freaking awesome. Together. As a weird, extended, idiosyncratic family. There’s no villain in this story. We are all just people. But now, we are people who have a choice. People who know better. People who can find out if we don’t know.

This paper has traced a single function across two thousand years: extraction. The taking of labour, resources, time, and autonomy from the many to concentrate wealth among the few. The form has changed — from chains to clock-time to credit scores — but the function has not. Each era legitimises its extraction through the prevailing ideology: natural order becomes divine right becomes free markets becomes economic necessity. And each era’s legitimation convinces the extracted that their condition is natural, earned, or chosen.

But here is what the evidence shows:

It is not natural. It is designed. Australia’s housing ratio of 14:1 did not grow on a tree. It was constructed by specific policies — negative gearing, capital gains tax discounts, foreign investment rules, bank lending practices — that can be un-constructed by specific alternative policies.

It is not earned. The wealth at the top was not produced by the people who hold it. It was produced by the people who built, grew, taught, nursed, cleaned, coded, drove, cooked, and cared — and extracted by mechanisms that ensured the producers received a diminishing share of what they produced.

It is not chosen. Nobody chose to be born into a system where housing costs 14 times their income. Nobody chose a financial system that creates money from nothing and charges interest on it. Nobody chose the enclosure of the commons, the destruction of subsistence alternatives, the commodification of land, labour, and money. These were imposed, incrementally, over centuries, by people who benefited from each increment.

And the evidence shows, with a consistency that is now beyond reasonable dispute, that when you change the function — when you reverse the direction of extraction, when you provide unconditional economic security to every person — **everything improves.**

Employment does not fall. It rises, and shifts toward meaningful work. Health improves. Education

increases. Crime declines. Poverty falls. Communities strengthen. Substance abuse does not increase. Children develop better. The effects are intergenerational. The administrative costs are lower. The political support is higher. The objections are refuted.

The global evidence base on Universal Basic Income has reached a point where the debate can — and should — shift from “would it work?” to “how should it be designed?” The remaining challenges are primarily political and institutional rather than economic or behavioural. The evidence shows that UBI works. The question is whether societies can muster the political will to implement it at scale.

For Australia, the question is even simpler. This is a country that sits on more mineral wealth per capita than almost any nation on earth. A country that already demonstrated, during COVID-19, that enhanced unconditional payments reduce poverty, improve health, and do not cause people to stop working. A country with the administrative infrastructure, the economic capacity, and the democratic traditions to implement a citizen’s dividend within a single electoral term.

The path from pilot to permanent, from local to national, from partial to full is neither simple nor guaranteed. But the evidence reviewed in this paper demonstrates that economic servitude is not a natural law. It is a design choice. And it can be redesigned.

Two thousand years of extraction. Two decades of evidence for the alternative. The form changes. The function persists — unless you change the function.

It is time to change the function.

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Appendix A: Cross-References to the OMXUS Research Series

This paper is No. 4 in the OMXUS Research Series (32 theses). Every paper in this series proves every other. What follows maps the connections.

Paper 01 — Bullshit Jobs: The Structural Production of Meaningless Work

`content/research/bullshit_jobs/`

Stockton’s SEED result — full-time employment rising from 28% to 40% — directly refutes the “dependency” objection and supports the bullshit jobs thesis: people freed from survival anxiety pursue meaningful work, not idleness. The problem is not that people won’t work without coercion. The problem is that the current system produces work that exists to justify itself rather than to serve human needs. UBI allows people to refuse bullshit jobs, which is precisely the mechanism by which work becomes meaningful.

Paper 02 — The \$19 Trillion Solution: Australia’s Hidden Wealth

`content/research/nineteen_trillion/`

Provides the fiscal architecture that makes national UBI implementable. Where this paper proves unconditional cash works across every pilot context, Paper 02 proves Australia already possesses the wealth to fund it permanently at \$800/week per adult. The two papers together answer both halves of the question: “Does it work?” (yes) and “Can we afford it?” (yes).

Paper 03 — Prevention Over Punishment: The Evidence for Upstream Intervention

`content/research/prevention_over_punishment/`

The Cherokee Casino Dividend finding — a 40% decline in child psychiatric disorders after unconditional income — is the economic proof of the prevention principle: when material conditions improve, the pathologies attributed to individual failure disappear without any intervention targeting individuals. UBI is prevention at scale.

Paper 04 — Economic Servitude (This Paper)

`content/research/economic_servitude/`

The historical and evidentiary foundation. Traces extraction mechanisms and synthesises global UBI evidence.

Paper 05 — Direct Democracy: The Swiss Model and Beyond

`content/research/democratic_voting_mechanisms/`

You cannot participate in self-governance when you work 50 hours a week. UBI and the 22-hour week are prerequisites for democratic participation. Switzerland manages four referendums a year because citizens have the time and economic security to engage.

Paper 06 — Housing First: Unconditional Shelter as Foundation

[content/research/housing_first/](#)

Housing First and UBI are complementary unconditional provisions. Both operate on the same principle: provide the foundation without conditions, and people build upward. The Australian housing crisis (14:1 price-to-income ratio) is simultaneously an argument for UBI (income) and Housing First (direct provision).

Paper 07 — The Justice Paradigm Shift: From Punishment to Restoration

[content/research/justice_paradigm_shift/](#)

Every paper in this series proves every other. UBI eliminates the poverty that causes the crime that justifies the policing that produces the punishment that increases the recidivism used to argue crime is inevitable. The entire punitive apparatus depends on maintaining the scarcity that UBI removes.

Paper 08 — Drug Policy Reform: From Criminalisation to Health

[content/research/drug_policy_reform/](#)

Portugal decriminalised all drugs and saw 80% fewer overdose deaths. But Portugal also invested in social reintegration — housing, employment, community. UBI provides the economic foundation that makes reintegration possible. Criminalisation is the enforcement arm of scarcity; remove the scarcity, and the rationale for criminalisation collapses.

Paper 09 — Emergency Response: The 60-Second Community Model

[content/research/emergency_response/](#)

The \$29 ring — press it, your people come in 60 seconds — requires a community. UBI provides the economic security that allows people to be available for their neighbours. You cannot be a community responder if you work 50 hours a week and commute 10 more.

Paper 10 — Cooperative Capitalism: Alternative Economic Structures

[content/research/cooperative_capitalism/](#)

Mondragon, Rojava, the Zapatistas, the Kerala model — all demonstrate that economic organisation can serve human needs rather than extract from them. UBI is compatible with and supportive of cooperative economic structures: it provides the floor of security from which cooperative enterprise can be built.

Paper 11 — Prison Abolition: Norway, Finland, and the Evidence for Decarceration

[content/research/justice_equation_cost_analysis_32Bau/](#)

Australia spends \$32 billion AUD per year on the justice system. Norway spends less per capita and achieves 20% recidivism versus Australia's 45%+. The Cherokee data shows that unconditional income reduces crime by 22% without any justice system intervention. UBI is cheaper than prison and more effective at reducing crime.

Paper 12 — Labour Economics: The 22-Hour Week

[content/research/labor_economics_22hr_week/](#)

The companion to this paper. If economic servitude is the diagnosis, the 22-hour week is part of the prescription. Productivity gains since the 1970s should have reduced working hours by half. Instead, they increased profits. UBI redistributes the gains; the 22-hour week redistributes the time.

Paper 13 — Community Policing Alternatives: CAHOOTS and Beyond

[content/research/community_policing_alternatives/](#)

CAHOOTS (Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets) has operated in Eugene, Oregon for 35 years with zero people killed. The model works because it responds to human needs rather than enforcing compliance. UBI addresses the root causes — poverty, housing insecurity, untreated mental illness — that generate the calls CAHOOTS responds to.

Paper 14 — Sanctuary Design: Architecture for Human Flourishing

[content/research/sanctuary_design_thesis/](#)

Physical spaces shape human behaviour. Economic conditions shape human behaviour. Sanctuary design and UBI operate on the same principle: design the environment for flourishing rather than for extraction and compliance.

Paper 15 — Education: From the Prussian Model to Play-Based Learning

[content/research/education_prussian_model/](#)

The Prussian model was designed to produce obedient workers and soldiers. It persists because it serves the extraction function: train people to sit still, follow instructions, and accept authority. UBI undermines the extraction function by providing alternatives. Education can then be redesigned around curiosity, mastery, and play — how humans actually learn.

Paper 16 — Social Group Scaling: The Ripple Model and Community Design

[content/research/social_group_scaling/](#)

Dunbar's number (approximately 150) was once cited as a hard cognitive ceiling on stable social relationships. It isn't. Lindenfors et al. (2021) re-ran Dunbar's original primate neocortex regression and found a 95% confidence interval of 2 to 520 — the number is statistically meaningless. The Ripple model replaces this discredited ceiling with a gradient: $\text{accountability} = 1/\text{distance}$, everyone connected to 8 billion, weighted by physical proximity. No fixed group boundary, no arbitrary cap. The person in front of you is the right one. Modern economic arrangements have destroyed the community structures within which proximity-based accountability forms. UBI provides the time

and security to rebuild them — not by capping groups at 150, but by letting the gradient emerge naturally.

Paper 17 — Food Toxicology and the Precautionary Principle

`content/research/food_toxicology_safety/`

Namibia’s child malnutrition dropping from 42% to 10% under basic income connects directly: what people eat is shaped by what they can afford. Poverty forces reliance on the cheapest, most processed, most harmful food supply. Economic security is nutritional security.

Paper 18 — Grief to Design: Turning Loss into Systems Change

`content/research/grieffodesign/`

This is where it all starts. Two children died. Their mother turned grief into a design specification for a better world. Every paper in this series, including this one, traces back to that grief. The evidence exists. The designs exist. The question is whether we build them.

Paper 19 — The Two Monkey Theory / Ideological Rorschach

`content/research/two_monkey_theory/` and `content/research/ideological_rorschach/`

The capuchin fairness experiment: two monkeys do the same task, one gets a grape, one gets a cucumber. The cucumber monkey throws the cucumber at the researcher. Even non-human primates reject unfair distribution. The ideological Rorschach shows that people’s response to this data reveals their prior commitments, not their rational analysis. The objections to UBI are not empirical — they are ideological. The evidence is settled. The resistance is identity.

The Convergence

Every paper proves every other. UBI eliminates the poverty that causes the crime (Paper 03) that justifies the policing (Paper 13) that produces the punishment (Paper 11) that increases the recidivism used to argue crime is inevitable — the entire punitive apparatus depends on maintaining the scarcity that UBI removes. The 22-hour week (Paper 12) frees the time that direct democracy (Paper 05) requires. Economic security (this paper) enables the community (Paper 16) that emergency response (Paper 09) depends on. The food supply (Paper 17) improves when people can afford real food. Education (Paper 15) transforms when children are not hungry and parents are not exhausted. Housing (Paper 06) becomes affordable when it is treated as shelter rather than a speculative asset.

The system is one system. The solution is one solution. The papers are separate because academic convention requires it. The reality they describe is unified.

Appendix B: Extraction Mechanisms Timeline

Period	Region	Mechanism	Legitimation	Extraction Rate	Source
3500 BCE	Sumer	Debt/tribute	Temple authority	Variable	Graeber (2011)
500 BCE–400 AD	Rome	Slavery, tribute, taxation	Natural order, conquest	30–40% enslaved	Patterson (1982); Scheidel (2011)
43–410 AD	Britain	Colonial taxation, slavery	Imperial authority	Variable	Wickham (2009)
500–1500	Europe	Serfdom, tithes, corvée	Divine right, tradition	~50% of labour (3 days/week + tithe)	Bloch (1961)
1500–1800	England	Enclosure of commons	Property rights, improvement	Loss of subsistence alternative	Federici (2004)
1760–1900	Britain	Wage labour, factory time	Free markets, progress	14–16 hour days, subsistence wages	Thompson (1963, 1967)
1500–1900	Global	Colonial extraction	Civilisation, racial hierarchy	Total (slavery) to majority (colonial taxation)	Van der Linden (2008)
1867	Theory	Capital accumulation analysis	—	Surplus value	Marx (1867)
1944	Theory	Commodification of land/labour/money	Self-regulating market	—	Polanyi (1944)
1980–present	Global	Debt currency, financialisation	Economic necessity, TINA	$r > g$ (Piketty)	Piketty (2014); Werner (2014)
1980–2024	Australia	Housing financialisation	Property rights, aspiration	4:1 → 14:1 price-to-income ratio	ABS (2024); RBA (2024)
2024	Australia	Household debt	Economic necessity	190% of disposable income	RBA (2024)
2024	Australia	Labour share decline	Productivity, globalisation	60% → 51% of national income	ABS (2024)

This paper is part of the OMXUS Research Series. Full series index: CONCLUSIONS.md

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The evidence exists. The designs exist. Build them.